Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 27
Issue 2 Spring 2019

Article 8

2019

Warrantless Searches of Electronic Devices at U.S. Borders:
Securing The Nation or Violating Digital Liberty?
Ahad Khilji
Catholic University of America (Student)

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts
Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, First Amendment Commons, Fourth
Amendment Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law
Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ahad Khilji, Warrantless Searches of Electronic Devices at U.S. Borders: Securing The Nation or Violating
Digital Liberty?, 27 Cath. U. J. L. & Tech 173 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt/vol27/iss2/8

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of CUA Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF
ELECTRONIC DEVICES AT U.S. BORDERS:
SECURING THE NATION OR VIOLATING
DIGITAL LIBERTY?
Ahad Khilji

“Sorry, this media file doesn’t exist on your internal storage.”1 This was the
message Ghassan Alasaad saw on his phone when he tried to view videos from
his daughter’s graduation.2 Unbeknownst to Mr. Alasaad, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) searched and seized his phone two weeks prior.3
The steady increase of U.S. citizens traveling with smart phones and other
electronic devices has been met with the rise of searches and seizures by CBP
officers at U.S borders.4 In July 2017, Ghassan and Nadia Alasaad were
traveling to Massachusetts with their eleven year old daughter who was ill, with
a high fever.5 The family was returning from their vacation in Quebec when CBP
officers approached them at the Highgate Springs crossing in Vermont.6 After
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1
Alasaad v. Nielsen: Plaintiffs’ Stories, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/
pages/alasaad-vs-duke-bios (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *2 (D. Mass.
May 9, 2018) (explaining CBP conducted nearly twice as many searches in the first half of
2017 than it did in all of 2015); Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile.
5
Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5.
6
Id.; Ghassan and Nadia Alasaad, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/bio/ghassan-and-
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leading the family to the secondary inspection area, officers interrogated Mr.
Alasaad while searching through his phone.7 Concerned with his daughter’s
health, Mr. Alasaad, a naturalized U.S. citizen and limousine driver, asked why
officers detained and searched his family, to which a CBP supervisor curtly
replied that he simply felt like putting the Alasaad family through a secondary
inspection.8 The CBP officers then demanded that Nadia Alasaad provide the
password for her locked phone.9 Mrs. Alasaad, also a naturalized U.S. citizen
and nursing student, objected on religious grounds.10 As a Muslim she always
wears a hijab when in public, and did not want officers to see photos of her
without a hijab, which her phone contained.11 After the officers threatened to
confiscate the phone if she did not provide the password, Ms. Alasaad reluctantly
adhered to their insistence.12 Due to the nature of the photos, Ms. Alasaad also
requested a female officer search her phone, however she was informed that
providing a female officer would cause hours of further delay.13 Exhausted from
their trip and detainment, and concerned about their daughter’s worsening
health, the Alasaad family was forced to depart, leaving their phones with the
CBP officers.14
Stories like the Alasaad family’s that involve coercive tactics and arbitrary
use of force by CBP officers are unfortunately common.15 In the early 2000s,
Americans were restricted to the usage of the Internet at a desktop computer in
the home or office, requiring an immobile Internet connection, or dial up modem
device to connect.16 Beginning in the late 2000s, the United States underwent a
radical departure from this outdated Internet lifestyle.17 Smartphones and mobile
devices are constantly being replaced by consumers with their newer counterpart
versions; the majority of Americans are now connected to the Internet while
traveling.18
Today 95% of Americans own some kind of cellular device.19 The percentage
of Americans who own smartphones has increased significantly from 35% in
nadia-alasaad (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
7
Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5.
8
Id.; ACLU, supra note 6.
9
Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5.
10 Id.; ACLU, supra note 6.
11 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 1.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5-8 (D. Mass.
May 9, 2018).
16 PEW RES. CTR., supra note 4.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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2011 to 77% in 2018.20 While most Americans own cellphones and belong to a
wide range of demographic groups, ownership of smart phones is often reflective
of one’s education, income and age.21 Mobile phones are not the only
information devices that Americans own.22 Almost 75% of adults living in the
United States own desktop or laptop computers, while approximately 50% own
tablets, and 20% own e-reader devices.23 While Americans have started to opt
out of traditional broadband services, the smartphone has been cited as the
increasingly main source of Internet access.24 Almost 20% of Americans receive
Internet access from just their smartphones.25 The primary use of smartphones
among lower-income Americans, minorities, and young adults is for Internet
access.26
The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has defined a Portable
Electronic Device (“PED”) as “any piece of lightweight, electrically-powered
equipment.”27 The FAA further provides that these “devices are typically
consumer electronics devices functionally capable of communications, data
processing and/or utility.”28 A September 2013 report by the FAA stated that
almost 94% of all U.S. adult passengers on airlines have traveled with at least
one PED in a one-year period of time.29 While passengers may place PEDs in
their checked baggage, the majority of PEDs have been brought onto the plane
in a carry-on item.30 The report lists cellphones, smartphones, laptops and
notebooks as the most common group of PEDs carried onto an aircraft, and
frequently searched by airport personnel.31
In April 2017, CBP released a report relating to electronic device searches at
the U.S. borders.32 Although only less than 0.1% of all travelers may actually be
subjected to a search while entering the United States, when comparing the
Id.
Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.; see also Jodie Griffin, Universal Service in an All-IP World, 23 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 346, 350 (2015) (discussing policy on universal internet access for everyone,
including Americans with low-income, disabilities, and rural area residents).
27 Fact Sheet – Portable Electronic Devices Aviation Rulemaking Committee Report,
Federal Aviation Administration, https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?
newsId=15255 (Oct. 31, 2013).
28 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., RECOMMENDATIONS ON EXPANDING THE USE OF PORTABLE
ELECTRONIC DEVICES DURING FLIGHT 3 (2013).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., CBP Releases Statistics on Electronic
Device Searches (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-mediarelease/cbp-releases-statistics-electronic-device-searches-0.
20
21
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statistics between a six month period (October-March) in 2016 with the same
period in 2017, electronic device searches have almost doubled from 8,383 to
14,993.33 Approximately one million travelers to the U.S. are inspected by the
CBP every day.34 Out of this population, nearly 2,500 electronic devices are
searched on a monthly basis since October 2016.35 Visitors, permanent residents,
and even U.S. citizens’ electronics may be subject to a search by CBP.36
This Comment will first examine the constitutionality of warrantless searches
of electronic devices at United States borders, a developing and fascinating legal
controversy which magnifies the broader debate between collective security and
individual privacy. The courts have not fully determined whether a U.S. citizen’s
electronic device can be searched at the border or airport. Then, Section II of
this Comment provides a background of the two conflicting views in the current
debate regarding warrantless searches at the border. Section III addresses the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and provides background
and context to the issue of whether warrantless searches of electronic devices
are constitutional. Next, Section IV explores the origin and development of both
CBP and ICE under the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).
Additionally, Section V examines the case, Alasaad v. Nielsen and provides an
analysis of how the court should rule on the request by plaintiffs that border
officers should have probable cause and secure a warrant before searching and
confiscating electronic devices. Although the plaintiffs also allege a First
Amendment violation,37 this Comment will only explore the Fourth Amendment
implications surrounding this case. Next, Section VI investigates the
disproportionate amount of Muslims that are randomly inspected and questioned
at the border and how the current presidential administration’s bias towards
Muslims have coincided and enforced this arbitrary screening method. Section
VII will examine alternatives other than adhering or attacking the policies of
CBP or ICE. Rather, this section will argue that individuals can choose to
prevent themselves from becoming possible victims of arbitrary searches by
following tips and advice on traveling with electronic devices. Finally, Section
VIII of the Comment will recommend that the U.S. District Court of
Id.
Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 1 (discussing allegations of how plaintiffs’ rights
were violated); Complaint for Injuctive and Declaratory Relief (Violation of First and
Fourth Amendment rights) at 11, Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 1:17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass.
Sept. 13, 2017) (arguing that “searches of electronic devices also impinge on
constitutionally protected speech and associational rights, including the right to speak
anonymously, the right to private association, the right to gather and receive information,
and the right to engage in newsgathering.”).
33
34
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Massachusetts rule in favor of the Alasaad family and other plaintiffs by issuing
an order of injunctive and declaratory relief against the unlawful warrantless
searches and seizures of the DHS, CBP and ICE.
I. TWO CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
BORDER SEARCHES
Proponents of these warrantless searches and seizures are the U.S. Federal
Government and its Executive Agencies.38 These searches began under
President George W. Bush and became more prevalent during The Obama
Administration.39 From October 2016 to March 2017, there were approximately
15,000 searches, compared to the 8,383 conducted in the year prior.40 During
these searches, officers are known to search through social media, messages,
photos, emails and private files.41 CBP officers allege the purpose of these
searches is to secure our nation’s borders by locating and combating terrorism,
exporting control violations, intellectual property rights infringement, and child
pornography.42 The CBP’s slogan succinctly captures its policy, stating,
“Securing America’s Border”.43 Similarly, the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) slogan is “Protecting National Security and Upholding
Public Safety.”44 In response to criticism, the ICE and CBP have said they are
required to search electronic devices by the same laws that authorize officers to
search suitcases at the border without a warrant.45 ICE and CBP have also stated
that the searches are not common and only happen to “fewer than one-hundredth
of one percent of international travelers.”46 According to John Wagner, a
commissioner at CBP, “border searches of electronic devices are essential to
enforcing the law at the U.S. border and to protecting the American people.”47
Proponents also utilize case law to bolster their argument.48 Courts have
38 Daniel Victor, Forced Searches of Phones and Laptops at U.S. Border Are Illegal,
Lawsuit Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/
technology/aclu-border-patrol-lawsuit.html.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Chris Megerian & Brian Bennett, U.S. dramatically increased searches of electronic
devices at airports in 2017, alarming privacy advocates, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-airport-search-devices-20180105-story.html.
42 Victor, supra note 38.
43 About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/about (last
visited Feb. 10, 2018).
44 Who We Are, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/
about (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
45 Victor supra note 38.
46 Id.
47 Megerian & Bennett, supra note 41.
48 Id.
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continuously held that although the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from
unreasonable searches, this can be outweighed in favor of the compelling
government interest in preventing crime and terrorism.49 According to Stewart
Baker, an expert on national security law and a senior policy official at DHS
from 2005-2009, “The basic principle is that however personal something is, it
is subject to search at the border because it is necessary to decide whether to
admit people and determine if they are carrying contraband.”50
However, privacy activists outright reject the stance that advocates of the
searches have taken.51 Opponents of warrantless searches of electronic devices
argue that the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment was created in
reference to luggage and only permits law enforcement to search containers at
the border, not electronic devices.52 While privacy advocates concede that
protecting the border is important for national security, they argue that an
American citizen or permanent resident crossing the border should have the
same rights, if not more than a person arrested for allegedly committing a
crime.53 Privacy Law Professor, Ryan Calo states that warrantless searches are
invasive for all travelers, but especially for U.S. citizens because these actions
are what “the 4th Amendment was designed to protect against, which is arbitrary
dragnet surveillance.”54 Criticisms of these searches have also come from past
government representatives.55 James Norton, a senior official at DHS during the
George W. Bush administration, described device searches of American citizens
as “problematic” and symbolic of a “mission creep.”56
Another concern with warrantless searches of electronic devices is that any
data or information customs officers seize and subsequently copy becomes
vulnerable to hackers.57 This problem is even more troublesome given the
federal government’s past failure in protecting private information.58 Unlike
Id.
Id.
51 Victor, supra note 38.
52 Id. (distinguishing devices in the context of the search-incident-to-arrest exception to
the warrant requirement).
53 Megerian & Bennett, supra note 47.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.; see also JEFFREY W. SEIFERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31798, DATA MINING:
AN OVERVIEW 12 (2004) (defining mission creep as “the use of data for purposes other than
that for which data was originally collected.”).
57 Megerian supra note 47.
58 Id.; see generally Nate Lord, Top 10 Biggest Government Data Breaches of All Time
in the U.S., DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2018), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/top-10biggest-us-government-data-breaches-all-time (discussing the various data breaches
experienced by the U.S. government and the private information that was exposed,
including the largest breach in which a voter database was accessed and information on 191
49
50
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outdated technology such as flip phones, smart phones and electronic devices
hold a vast amount of personal information or data. Cellphones containing all of
this data act as a portal into the private life of their users.59 Privacy activists
argue that this vast amount of sensitive information was not intended to be
subjected to warrantless searches.60 When border officials search through a
smart phone or any electronic device, it essentially allows them to improperly
intrude into someone’s entire life.61 Nathan Wessler, an attorney for the
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), observed that searching devices not
only affects the individual traveler, but everyone the traveler has ever
communicated with as well, which in effect reduces the overall security and trust
of electronic information.62 Wessler emphasizes the negative effect on the U.S.
tourism industry by asking: “what traveler is going to want to lay bare every
intimate detail of their social media history, exposing years of their lives?”63
Alasaad v. Nielsen is a case arising out of the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, which has exemplified the debate of warrantless
searches of devices at the border.64 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”)
and the ACLU filed the lawsuit against DHS, as well as CBP and ICE, over
warrantless border searches.65 The two organizations represent eleven plaintiffs,
including the Alasaad family, who had their smartphones and computers seized
and searched by border agents without any kind of warrant, probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.66 Ten of the plaintiffs are U.S. citizens and one of them is
a permanent resident.67 The diverse plaintiff group includes veterans, students,

million Americans was exposed).
59 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (explaining how the vast amount of
information stored on a cell phone can be aggregated to give a person a view into an
individual’s private life); Dustin Volz & Nat’l Journal, The Supreme Court Is About to
Decide the Future of Cell-Phone Privacy, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/04/the-supreme-court-is-about-todecide-the-future-of-cell-phone-privacy/361332.
60 Volz & Nat’l Journal, supra note 59.
61 Id.
62 Andy Greenberg, A GUIDE TO GETTING PAST CUSTOMS WITH YOUR DIGITAL
PRIVACY INTACT, WIRED (Feb. 12, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/
guide-getting-past-customs-digital-privacy-intact.
63 Id.
64 Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730, 2018 WL 2170323, at *1 (D. Mass. May 9,
2018); see also ALASAAD V. NIELSEN: CHALLENGE TO WARRANTLESS PHONE AND
LAPTOP SEARCHES AT U.S. BORDER, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/alasaad-vnielsen-challenge-warrantless-phone-and-laptop-searches-us-border (last updated Apr. 20,
2019).
65 Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *1; ACLU, supra note 64.
66 Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *1; ACLU, supra note 64.
67 Taylor Hatmaker, Trump administration sued over warrantless smartphone searches
at US borders, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 13, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/13/alasaadv-duke-eff-aclu-dhs-warrantless-searches/.
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journalists, and an engineer for NASA, each of whom were returning to their
home in the U.S. after traveling overseas.68 Although none of the plaintiffs were
accused of any specific crime or violation, some of them had their smartphones
held for months by border officials.69
ACLU attorney, Esha Bhandari commented on the case stating: “electronic
devices contain massive amounts of information that can paint a detailed picture
of our personal lives, including emails, texts, contact lists, photos, work
documents, and medical or financial records.”70 Bhandari goes on to state that
“the Fourth Amendment requires that the government get a warrant before it can
search the contents of smartphones and laptops at the border.”71 The Alasaad
family reached out to Jessie Rossman, an attorney for the Massachusetts chapter
of the ALCU, after their humiliating experience at the border.72 Rossman
explained that the Alasaads, as well as the other plaintiffs, are not seeking
financial compensation.73 Instead, the plaintiffs want the court to prevent future
searches and seizures of electronic devices without a warrant, probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.74 Therefore, their complaint calls for both declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief; to ask the government to stop the practice of
these searches and hold such warrantless searches as unlawful and
unconstitutional.75 Rossman highlights, “What is important to emphasize about
phones is that our phones have become blueprints for our entire lives . . . a
cellphone is not a suitcase.”76
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. It states as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
Id.
Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Jess Aloe, Couple detained at Vermont border crossing sue government over
warrantless phone search, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/2017/09/13/couple-detained-vermontborder-crossing-sue-government-over-warrantless-phone-search/654673001.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Violation of First and Fourth
Amendment rights), supra note 37, at 4; Aloe, supra note 72.
76 Aloe, supra note 72.
68
69
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probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.77
The Fourth Amendment and its interpretation remains a central issue in
criminal law as well as privacy law, providing guidance on law enforcement and
their duties and responsibilities.78 Along with protecting citizens against
capricious arrests, it is the foundation governing different forms of law
enforcement surveillance, search warrants, wiretaps, safety inspections, and the
stop-and-frisk.79
When plaintiffs invoke their rights under the Fourth Amendment, providing
that their rights thereunder have been violated in a case, the first issue is whether
in fact a “search” actually occurred.80 In Katz v. United States,81 the Supreme
Court ruled that a “search” had occurred when a microphone was placed on top
of a telephone booth, which was being used by the defendant.82 The Court found
that defendant Charles Katz had an expectation of privacy when he closed the
door of the phone booth, and the court determined that society has generally
deemed this type of behavior as a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”83 The
majority opinion, in which Justice Harlon concurs, formulated the reasonable
expectation test in order to determine whether the Government has conducted a
search.84 This test was later applied in Smith v. Maryland,85 where the Supreme
Court held that if an individual “has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy,” and “society is prepared to recognize that this expectation is
(objectively) reasonable, then there is a right of privacy in the given
circumstance.”86
The Fourth Amendment also protects people against brief detentions.87 In
United States v. Mendenhall,88 the Court found that a seizure of a person occurs
only when they must submit to the show of force or authority.89 However, in
Florida v. Bostick,90 the Supreme Court ruled that a “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment does not occur during “citizen encounters” or in the event that law
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV, §3.
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 865 (2004).
79 Id. at 865-66.
80 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967).
81 Id. at 348.
82 Id. at 353.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 361.
85 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
86 Id. at 739-41.
87 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980).
88 Id. at 553.
89 Id.
90 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
77
78
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enforcement does not require individuals to comply with their requests.91 In this
case,92 officers approached Defendant Terrance Bostick who was riding on a bus
and asked him to produce his bus ticket and license.93 The officers told Bostick
that they were looking for narcotics and asked him if they could search his
luggage.94 After receiving Bostick’s permission and searching his bag, the
officers found cocaine and arrested him.95 The Court in Florida held that the
search of the bag was reasonable and permitted because Bostick could have
declined the officers’ request and left the bus on his own accord.96 Therefore, if
an individual can choose to not answer questions by law enforcement there has
not been an intrusion or seizure of that person.97
For purposes of determining whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated, a “seizure” has occurred when an individual has been
arrested and taken into police custody.98 However, law enforcement is
authorized to briefly “seize” an individual when they believe that the individual
is connected to a crime, also known as a “Terry stop.”99 In Terry v. Ohio,100 the
Supreme Court held officers may perform a limited search of a suspect’s outer
garments in order to locate weapons only if they have a “reasonable and
articulable” suspicion that the individual detained may have a weapon due to the
nature of the suspected crime.101
Reasonable suspicion requires law enforcement to have “specific and
articulable facts” that the individual is about to engage in a crime.102 Reasonable
suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause, which is the high standard
required to arrest someone or obtain a search warrant. Additionally, whether
reasonable suspicion exists also depends on the “totality of the circumstances,”
which is the combination of factors regarding the specific incident.103 Probable
cause for an arrest requires that law enforcement have “the facts and
circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information,” which would cause a reasonable person to believe that

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Id. at 431-32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 437-38.
Id.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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the individual was involved or is involved in a crime.104 The Fourth Amendment
requires that in order to be valid, a warrant must establish probable cause that
the search will lead to contraband, or will uncover criminal activity.105
Generally, officers must have legally sufficient reasons to believe a search is
necessary.106
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are usually unreasonable,
unless an established exception is applicable.107 Established by the First
Congress of the United States of America, the border search doctrine is arguably
the most fundamental and established exceptions within the Constitution.108 This
exception permits searches and seizures at U.S. borders without probable cause
or a warrant.109 Border searches are not similar to inventory searches or
administrative searches because they are not searching for evidence that will
justify the detaining of travelers and eventual arrests.110 Rather, searches are
deemed “routine,” or “non-routine” depending on the intrusiveness of the
search.111 Accordingly, a routine border search does not offend or pose a serious
invasion of privacy on the individual.112 In the past this type of border search
has involved a pat-down for weapons or contraband,113 the use of a drug-sniffing
dog114, the removal of jackets, shoes, or hats or the emptying of purses, wallets
and pockets115, and the x-ray of objects.116
In Florida v. Bostick,117 the Court ruled that because an individual can choose
what items they bring with them while traveling the individual therefore has a
chance to lower the level of intrusion they experience at the border.118 Courts
tend to examine the particular technique, mainly the degree of intrusiveness or
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925).
106 Id.
107 YULE KIM, CONG. RES. SERV., RL31826, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER: BORDER
SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 7 (2009).
108 Act of July 31, ch.5 §§ 23-24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789) (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§§482, 1582); KIM, supra note 107.
109 United States v. Ramsey, 431 US 606, 616-19 (1977).
110 KIM, supra note 107.
111 Id.
112 United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993); KIM, supra note 107,
at 9.
113 See United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a pat-down
was not intrusive enough and was instead considered to be a routine search); KIM, supra
note 107, at 9.
114 United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294-95 (5th Cir. 2002); KIM, supra note 107, at
9.
115 United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981); KIM, supra note 107,
at 9.
116 United States v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 2002); KIM, supra note 107, at 9.
117 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991).
118 Id. at 437; KIM, supra note 107, at 10.
104
105
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invasiveness, in order to decide the classification of a search as routine or nonroutine.119 In United States v. Braks,120 the court evaluated six factors for their
analysis:
(1) whether the search results in exposure of intimate body parts or
requires the suspect to disrobe; (2) whether physical contact between
Customs officials and the suspect occurs during the search; (3)
whether force is used to effect the search; (4) whether the type of
search exposes the suspect to pain or danger; (5) the overall manner
in which the search is conducted; and (6) whether the suspect’s
reasonable expectations, if any, are abrogated by the search.121
In United States v. Ramsey,122 the defendants were involved in a heroin drug ring
whereby the defendants utilized the mail to transport heroin into the United
States.123 In New York, a customs inspector intercepted eight envelopes that
were heavier and thicker than typical airmail.124 The inspector believed the
envelopes contained illegal narcotics and opened them finding the heroin as he
initially suspected.125 The customs inspector then sent the letters to the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) in Washington D.C, and the letters were
then opened by agents without a warrant but on the mere suspicion that the
envelopes contained drugs.126 The Supreme Court held that the search of the
envelopes did not violate the Fourth Amendment and instead was a routine
search that did not require probable cause or a warrant.127 In the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote “searches made at the border, pursuant
to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and
examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable
simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”128
Courts have defined a non-routine search as any time an official conducting
the search goes beyond a limited intrusion.129 This type of search strays further
away from a routine search and involves a combination of “strip searches, cavity
searches, x-ray examinations” and the prolonged detention of an individual.130

KIM, supra note 107, at 10.
United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511-12 (1st Cir. 1988).
121 Id.; KIM, supra note 107, at 10.
122 United States v. Ramsey, 431 US 606, 609-11 (1977).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 616.
129 KIM, supra note 107, at 10.
130 See United States v. Reyes, 821 F.2d 168, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1987) (labeling a strip
search as non-routine); see United States v. Adenkunle, 2 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1993) (x119
120

2019]

Warrantless Searches of Electronic Devices at U.S. Borders

185

Further, the law demands government officials to have at least a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity in order to subject an individual to a non-routine
search.131 This standard typically requires an official to have “a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person” of illegal activity.132 In
United States v. Forbicetta,133 the Court held that reasonable suspicion existed
when officials had observed the following facts: (1) the suspect arrived from
Bogota, Colombia, (2) the defendant was by herself, (3) she only carried one bag
and did not have any items that would require further inspection, (4) she was
attractive, and (5) she was wearing a loose-fitted garb.134 However, courts have
rejected the argument that arriving from a specific country or location could
alone provide reasonable suspicion without the support of other factors.135
The Supreme Court has not stated what level of suspicion is required for nonroutine searches, nor have they articulated what factors are required to label a
search as routine or non-routine.136 This dilemma was partially resolved in
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,137 where the Supreme Court addressed
the “clear indication” standard.138 In this case, the Court concluded that “clear
indication” was in fact not a third standard, instead it is merely a term used to
specify the requirement for particularized suspicion.139 Therefore, the standard
held widely by the courts for non-routine searches is reasonable suspicion.140
III. CBP AND ICE SEARCH AND SEIZURE FAIL TO SUFFICIENTLY
PROTECT THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF TRAVELERS
After the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States
Government reformed national security and border control policies to restrict
who was allowed in the country.141 In March 2003, President George W. Bush
created the DHS in order to unite different agencies tasked with protecting the
ray examination and continued detention); KIM, supra note 107, at 10.
131 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985); KIM, supra note
107, at 10.
132 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 (“the police officer must be able to point
to specific and articulable facts.”) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); KIM, supra
note 107, at 11.
133 U.S. v. Forbicetta, 484 F.2d 645, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1973).
134 Id.; KIM, supra note 107, at 11.
135 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); KIM, supra note 107, at 11.
136 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n.4.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 533.
140 Id. at 541.
141 Willa Frej, How U.S. Immigration Policy Has Changed Since 9/11, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-immigration-since911_us_57d05479e4b0a48094a71bc0.
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nation.142 Within the DHS, the three main agencies consist of CBP, ICE and U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).143 The post 9/11 duties of
these agencies include cooperating and communicating information with other
countries, requiring further screenings and interviews with people of certain
backgrounds, and collecting information on international travelers.144
ICE was formulated based on the belief that threats have now become global
and even more dangerous, therefore a new technique was needed to secure the
American people.145 As a result, ICE was granted civil and criminal authority in
order to protect national security.146 The creation of CBP in particular
consolidated the roles and responsibilities of multiple organizations into one
agency.147 This enabled CBP to develop unified security procedures and ensure
compliance in the nation’s health, immigration and international trade
regulations and laws.148 Whereas ICE was created in response to the tragic
events of 9/11,149 CBP actually traces its original functions to the U.S. Customs
Service, which was established on July 31, 1789.150 Although CBP replaced the
U.S. Customs Service, its commissioner and the majority of the staff, as well as
their responsibilities, transitioned to CBP.151
In the present case of Alasaad v. Nielsen, the defendants are Secretary of DHS
Kirstjen Nielsen, Acting Commissioner of CBP Kevin McAleenan, and Acting
Director of ICE Thomas Homan.152 CBP and ICE are listed as defendants along
with the DHS because their policies expressly authorize the challenged searches
and confiscations the plaintiffs suffered.153 These policies are controversial and
allegedly unconstitutional because they do not require a warrant, probable cause,
or even reasonable suspicion to believe that an electronic device may contain
contraband.154 CBP’s previous policy, which was initiated in 2009, authorized

142 March 1, 2003: CBP is Born, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/
about/history/march-1-2003-cbp-born (last modified Aug. 1, 2016).
143 Frej, supra note 141.
144 Id.
145 See Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/hsi (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
146 History, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/history
(last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
147 CBP Through the Years, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/
about/history (last visited Arp. 17, 2019).
148 Id.
149 History, supra note 146.
150 CBP Through the Years, supra note 147.
151 Id.
152 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition of Government’s Motion to Dismiss at i,
Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2018).
153 Id. at 1.
154 Id.
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agents to search and examine travelers’ electronic devices without any
reasonable suspicion.155 The updated 2018 policy intends to differentiate
between a “basic” and an “advanced” search.156 Basic searches involve an agent
tapping or manually searching through an electronic device while opening files
or applications.157 However, advanced searches authorize agents to use software
or other devices to essentially conduct a forensic examination of the contents of
the device.158 Under the new policy, basic searches are still permissible without
any degree of suspicion, but now advanced searches require reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity.159
One of the plaintiffs in Alasaad v. Nielsen, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(“EFF”) identified several problems with the new CBP policy.160 First, the
updated rules have a loophole which allows agents to carry out an advanced
search in the interest of national security.161 The broad interpretation of “national
security” as well as “articulable factors” will surely lead to unreasonable and
arbitrary searches.162 Second, by only requiring reasonable suspicion for
electronic device searches instead of a probable cause warrant as required by the
Constitution, means that the updated policy is still unconstitutional.163 Third, the
distinction between “basic” and “advanced” searches is blurred since basic
searches can still be intrusive and violate a traveler’s privacy, sometimes even
more so than an advanced search.164 While conducting a basic search, agents can
gain access to an individual’s text messages, contacts, emails, videos, photos,
calendars and browsing history.165 Collectively, this data viewed as a whole may
reveal sensitive and private information about the individual’s religion, political
beliefs, finances, health, sex life, and family.166
However, a positive aspect of the updated CBP policy is that it prohibits an
155 Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey, New CBP Border Device Search Policy Still Permits
Unconstitutional Searches, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2018/01/new-cbp-border-device-search-policy-still-permits-unconstitutionalsearches; U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049: BORDER
SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION 3 (2009).
156 Cope & Mackey, supra note 155; U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 155.
157 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR CBP
BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES DHS/CBP/PIA-008(A) 6 (2018); Cope &
Mackey, supra note 155.
158 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 157; Cope & Mackey, supra note
155.
159 Id.
160 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, supra note 155; Cope & Mackey, supra
note 155.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
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agent’s access to cloud data and content.167 Agents instead are required to place
devices in airplane mode and disable them from connecting to wireless
networks.168
The preclusion from accessing cloud content was acknowledged by CBP in a
letter that was sent in response to questions posed by U.S. Senator, Ron Wyden,
U.S. Senator Rand Paul, and other members of the Senate Finance Committee.169
Senators Wyden and Paul have been at the forefront of introducing legislation
making it illegal for border agents to search and seize electronic devices without
a warrant or probable cause.170 The practice of CBP agents forcing citizens to
provide passwords and access to social media is especially alarming for privacy
advocates.171 Senator Wyden asked DHS to clarify this controversial practice, a
request which Kevin McAleenan, acting commissioner of CBP, responded to in
a letter regarding the cloud policy and its revisions.172 In the letter, McAleenan
stated CBP has officially reminded the agents that they can only access data
which is physically present on an electronic device.173 This statement reversed
the 2009 CBP policy, which allowed agents to examine any data or information
intercepted during a search, including cloud content.174 McAleenan clarified that
agents are authorized to search a device without the consent of the owner and in
rare cases without reasonable suspicion or warrant.175 However, these searches
can only include content that is stored and saved directly onto the device, such
as photos, videos, text messages and recent calls.176 McAleenan concluded that
while travelers may refuse to provide their password or unlock their device,
agents may confiscate the phone.177 While privacy advocates such as EFF
applaud the enhanced privacy considerations in the new CBP policy, there are
still concerns, and ICE has utterly failed to issue an equivalent policy. 178

Id.
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, supra note 155; E.D. Cauchi, Border Patrol
Says It’s Barred From Searching Cloud Data on Phones, NBC NEWS (July 12, 2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/border-patrol-says-it-s-barred-searching-clouddata-phones-n782416.
169 Cauchi, supra note 168; Brian Fung, Travelers just won back a bit of their privacy at
the border, WASH. POST (July 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2017/07/14/travelers-just-won-back-a-bit-of-their-privacy-at-the-border/
?utm_term=.1a2367ca36f0.
170 Cauchi, supra note 168; Fung, supra note 169.
171 Cauchi, supra note 168; Fung, supra note 169.
172 Cauchi, supra note 168; Fung, supra note 169.
173 Fung, supra note 169.
174 Cope & Mackey, supra note 155.
175 Cauchi, supra note 168; Fung, supra note 169.
176 Cauchi, supra note 168; Fung, supra note 169.
177 Cauchi, supra note 168.
178 Cope & Mackey, supra note 155.
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Moreover, ICE agents are not subject to CBP policies and may access cloud data
under their own authority.179
IV. ALASAAD V. NIELSEN: THE COURT’S OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY
PROTECTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AT THE BORDER
A. Complaint
In September 2017, EFF and ACLU filed a lawsuit against the United States,
including DHS, CBP, and ICE, on behalf of eleven plaintiffs who had their
electronic devices searched at the border without probable cause or a warrant.180
The amended complaint alleged that CBP and ICE policies violated the Fourth
Amendment by allowing agents to search electronic devices without even a
reasonable suspicion that the device contained information indicating that an
individual had broken customs or immigration laws.181 The complaint also
challenged the confiscation of electronic devices for extended periods of time
without probable cause.182
The plaintiffs asked the Court to apply the holding of Riley v. California to
the instant case relating to the border context.183 In Riley, defendant David Leon
Riley was pulled over for driving on expired license registration tags.184 Riley’s
license was suspended and police had his car impounded.185 Before impounding
Riley’s car the police performed an inventory search which allowed them to
search for further hidden contraband.186 The police found two guns in the car
and arrested Riley.187 During the arrest, Riley had his cell phone in his pocket
and detectives discovered photographs of him making gang signs which
eventually led to police discovering that Riley was involved in a recent gang
shooting.188 Riley moved to suppress the evidence on his phone, including the
photo depicting his gang affiliation as an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.189 The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the government’s
argument that searching a cell phone is the same as searching physical items.190
Id.
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Violation of First and Fourth
Amendment rights), supra note 37, at 2.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2473 (2014).
184 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Violation of First and Fourth
179
180
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The Court stated, “[t]hat is like saying a ride on horseback is materially
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”191 Therefore, the plaintiffs in the
instant case argued that ICE and CBP agents must also obtain a warrant based
on probable cause before conducting searches of electronic devices at the
border.192
B. Motion to Dismiss
Three months after plaintiffs filed the complaint with the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the Government responded with
a Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.193 First, the
Government’s affirmative defense is that plaintiffs lack the necessary Article III
standing to proceed with the case and therefore their claims should be
dismissed.194 However, the plaintiffs asserted that they did have standing on the
basis they may suffer an impending injury because they still plan to travel
internationally and risk subsequent warrantless searches of their electronic
devices.195 The Government argued that this “speculative fear of future harm
does not satisfy the constitutional injury requirement.”196 In light of border
search statistics provided in the amended complaint, the Government stated that
“there is a miniscule chance of any future border search of Plaintiffs’ electronic
devices.”197
The Government also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the warrantless
searches of electronic devices at the border constituted a Fourth Amendment
violation.198 Although the Government acknowledged that these searches must
be reasonable, they cite United States v. Montoya de Hernandez199 to state that

Amendment rights), supra note 37, at 3.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 2-3.
193 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Alasaad
v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2017).
194 Id. at 8.
195 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Violation of First and Fourth
Amendment rights), supra note 37, at 37; Government’s Memorandum in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 193.
196 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193.
197 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Violation of First and Fourth
Amendment rights), supra note 37, at 9; Government’s Memorandum in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 193.
198 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Violation of First and Fourth
Amendment rights), supra note 37, at 14; Government’s Memorandum in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 193.
199 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
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“the Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at
the international border than in the interior.”200 In Montoya de Hernandez,201
customs officers stopped defendant Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez at the
Los Angeles Airport under suspicion that she was a drug mule and was
smuggling cocaine from Columbia in her alimentary canal.202 Montoya de
Hernandez did not speak or use the bathroom during the extended detainment,
and a court order was obtained by officials for an x-ray.203 At the hospital, a
balloon filled with cocaine was found in her rectum, and eventually Hernandez
passed 88 additional balloons filled with cocaine.204 Montoya de Hernandez
argued that her detention violated the Fourth Amendment because customs
officers did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that she was smuggling
drugs.205 The Supreme Court found that the standard of proof in this case was
met by her numerous recent trips from Bogota to Los Angeles or Miami.206
The Government provided an array of cases to distinguish between the
various standards of proof required for different electronic devices.207 In House
v. Napolitano,208 the same court as the instant case, held that while some
searches “require the government to assert some level of suspicion,” the search
of a laptop computer “does not invade one’s dignity and privacy in the same
way” as those searches.209 In addition, the Ninth Circuit held that reasonable
suspicion is the standard of proof for a “forensic examination” of an individual’s
computer.210 The Government affirmed its argument that only reasonable
suspicion is needed at the border in accordance with United States v. Kolsuz,211
where the court found that “the highest protection available for a border search
is reasonable suspicion.”212 The Government also refuted the Plaintiffs’ claim
that device confiscations for extended periods of time were unconstitutional.213
200 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.
201 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 532-34.
202 Id. at 534.
203 Id. at 531.
204 Id. at 536.
205 Id. at 531.
206 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544.
207 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193.
208 House v. Napolitano, No. 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816, at *7 (D. Mass. Mar.
28, 2012).
209 Id.; Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 17.
210 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013).
211 United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F.Supp.3d 843, 859 (E.D. Va. 2016).
212 Id.
213 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 26-27.
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Specifically, the Government cited to Montoya de Hernandez,214 where the
Supreme Court held that instead of time limits “common sense and ordinary
human experience must govern over rigid criteria.”215
The Plaintiff argued the Court should extend the Supreme Court precedent
established by Riley v. California216 by holding that law enforcement must have
probable cause warrants to conduct searches at the border.217 The Government
strongly disagreed with this interpretation and instead argued that Riley limited
its holding to the search incident to arrest context.218 In Riley the court stated
that while “the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones,
other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a
particular phone.”219 The Government contended that the border search doctrine
allows full searches of electronic devices unlike the search incident to arrest
exception.220 The threat of contraband, such as child pornography and
information pertaining to illegal activity such as malware or “export-controlled
material,” is easily transferred at the border and serves as a threat to national
security.221 Furthermore, the larger storage capacity of electronic devices
maintains a greater amount of contraband and harmful data brought in at the
border.222 For these reasons, the Government contended that Riley may not be
interpreted to overturn or undermine the border search doctrine and is applied
strictly to the search incident to arrest exception.223 However, the Government’s
argument to preclude Riley’s application to this case is insufficient given the
present technological landscape. The importance of smart phones and other
devices to travelers as raised earlier in this comment show a modern trend
towards digital liberty. The Government’s argument fails because it is an
unsupported blanket statement that does not adequately address the
constitutional issue at hand.

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985).
Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 26-27.
216 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493-95 (2014) (holding that law
enforcement needs a warrant to search a cell phone absent exigent circumstances).
217 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 26-27
218 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 19.
219 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
220 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 20.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
214
215
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C. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
In January 2018, plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the
Government’s Motion to Dismiss.224 The memorandum argued against the
Government’s attempt to discredit plaintiffs’ standing and instead reaffirmed the
validity of their claims.225 Article III standing is established when a plaintiff
shows: (1) an “injury in fact”; (2) a “causal connection” between the defendant’s
conduct and the injury; and (3) probability that a favorable decision by the court
will “redress” the alleged injury.226 The memorandum also cited City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons,227 to clarify that the plaintiffs in this case are able to show “a
sufficient likelihood that [they] will again be wronged in a similar way.”228 To
argue that standing cannot be challenged prematurely, plaintiffs refer to McBride
v. Cahoone,229 where the court denied a motion to dismiss an injunctive relief
claim because of how early in the stage the motion was filed.230 The
memorandum also emphasized that some plaintiffs have already been accosted
multiple times at the border, and therefore it is likely they will be stopped and
searched again in the future.231 Furthermore, the plaintiffs plan to continue
traveling internationally to visit family and friends, work or vacation.232 As a
result, plaintiffs are more likely than other travelers to be detained and searched
again because their past records will alert agents of past searches and will lead
to them suffering the whole ordeal again.233
The standing argument that plaintiffs presented to the court have several
merits. Most importantly, there is an arguable “injury in fact,” as the plaintiffs
in this case were seized and had their devices searched without even reasonable
suspicion, which is in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Further, plaintiffs
satisfy the causation element because the policies of CBP and ICE acting under
DHS condone the unconstitutional conduct. Additionally, plaintiffs have proven
redressability as border patrol agents have stopped some of the plaintiffs several
224 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1,
Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass Jan. 26, 2018).
225 Id. at 4-6.
226 Lujuan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
227 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note
224, at 5.
228 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
229 McBride v. Cahoone, 820 F.Supp.2d 623, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
230 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note
224, at 5; Cahoone, 820 F.Supp.2d at 633.
231 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note
224, at 6.
232 Id.
233 See id.; see, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, No. 05-cv-582D, 2005 WL 3531828, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005) (stating that government databases with information about past
stops “could be used to expand, enhance, or lengthen a border investigation”).
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times and will likely stop these plaintiffs in the future because they are in the
system despite no criminal activity being reported during the first seizure at the
border. If national security interests are truly at the forefront it would be most
efficient to remove people from the list who have already been interrogated and
rule them out as potential criminals. Not only are these searches
unconstitutional, but also inefficient and actual criminals can slide by detection.
The waste of taxpayer’s dollars and build-up of animosity by normal innocent
travelers most likely do not help security interests at the border.
Plaintiffs rebutted the Government’s opposition to their Fourth Amendment
argument by stating that the warrant requirement was created for the exact
privacy interests present in the instant case.234 Plaintiff’s memorandum
elaborated why electronic devices are dissimilar to physical objects because of
their “highly personal” nature and “immense storage capacity.”235 The
memorandum stressed that if the court was to rule in favor of the Government,
the Government will have access to “a virtual warehouse” of people’s lives just
because they decide to travel overseas.236 Plaintiffs believed that Riley237 does
not extend any exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to
digital data searches.238 Instead, Riley required a balancing test between an
individual’s privacy interests and legitimate governmental interests.239 While the
Government continuously cited the goals of customs and immigration
enforcement, it did not address the fact that the warrantless search of electronic
devices do not advance these goals.
Although Plaintiffs conceded that illegal digital contraband such as child
pornography can be transferred via the border, they pointed out that contraband
can easily be transported across the Internet.240 This highlights the outdated
philosophy of the Government because they do not take into consideration how
different physical contraband is from digital contraband. For example, drug
smuggling involves a physical object being moved through the border while
child pornography and other digital crimes are primarily conducted online. The
Government pointed to the border search exception to justify warrantless
searches but Plaintiffs argued that this exception does not extend to electronic

234 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment,
and Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 14, Alasaad v. Nielsen, No.
17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass Feb. 2, 2015).
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489-90 (2014).
238 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment,
and Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 234, at 19.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 19.
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devices and instead agents must obtain probable cause or a warrant to search a
device.241 Plaintiffs maintained that even if warrantless searches advance the
government’s goals of immigration and customs enforcement, the privacy
interests that individuals have in their electronic devices outweigh these
governmental interests.242 Finally, Plaintiffs firmly believed that the harm of
warrantless searches will increase as the Government’s technological capability
to search electronic devices becomes even more powerful.243
D. Support of Motion to Dismiss
In March 2018, the Government briefly replied in support of its motion to
dismiss.244 The memorandum made it clear that there is no case law supporting
the contention that a border search requires probable cause or a warrant.245 The
Government also reaffirmed its position that Plaintiffs do not have adequate
standing to proceed.246 Namely, the Government argued the Plaintiffs lack
standing in accordance with the Supreme Court’s holding in Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA,247 providing that a group of respondents had lacked standing to
challenge the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act because their alleged injury
was not impending and only hypothetical.248 In Clapper, the Court further stated
that it is not enough to establish “an objectively reasonable likelihood of future
injury, as that standard is inconsistent with our requirement that threatened
injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.”249 The
Government disregarded the Plaintiffs’ arguments for standing and alleged that
because different reasons were provided for standing this is indicative of the lack
of standing.250
The Government rejected Plaintiff’s interpretation of Riley in that a warrant
is required for electronic device searches at the border.251 The memorandum
pointed to United States v. Ramos,252 where the Court held that the searches

Id. at 15.
Id. at 20.
243 Id. at 23.
244 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 1.
245 Id. at 8.
246 Id. at 11.
247 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).
248 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 14.
249 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.
250 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 9-10.
251 Id. at 20.
252 Id. at 19.
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implicated in Riley were to be limited only to search incident to arrest.253
Furthermore, the Government contended that the warrantless border search of
an electronic device was consistent with the justifications for the border search
exception which is “protecting the country by preventing unwanted goods from
crossing the border into the country.”254 According to Flores-Montano,255 the
border search doctrine gives the United States “inherent authority to protect, and
a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity.”256 While the plaintiffs
believed that the privacy interests of individuals outweigh governmental
interests, the Government vehemently disagreed and instead stated that the
balance of interests pertaining to the search is “struck much more favorably to
the Government at the border.”257 For these reasons, the Government asked the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to dismiss the
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.258
E. Motion to Dismiss Denied
On May 9, 2018, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts issued a memorandum and order denying the government’s
motion to dismiss.259 The Court ruled that the Plaintiffs had standing on two
grounds and their claims that the government’s conduct violated the Fourth
Amendment were sufficient and the case could continue forward to discovery.260
The Court agreed that there was standing because plaintiffs could be subject
to future searches at the border and have their electronic devices confiscated
again especially since this has already happened to four plaintiffs on multiple
occasions.261 The Court also agreed with plaintiff’s allegation that because
officers are alerted to past searches in a database the plaintiffs are more likely
than other travelers to suffer future searches.262 The Court stated that “even a
253 United States v. Ramos, 190 F.Supp.3d 922, 1002 (S.D. Cal. 2016); see Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
254 United States v. Feiten, No. 15-200631, 2016 WL 894452, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9,
2016); Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 20.
255 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004).
256 Id.
257 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540 (1985); Government’s
Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 193, at 16-17.
258 Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 193, at 16-17.
259 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 23, Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV11730-DJC (D. Mass May 9, 2018).
260 Id. at 11, 12, 21.
261 Id. at 10-11.
262 Id. at 11.
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small probability of injury is sufficient,” and disregarded the government’s
argument that plaintiffs lack standing because of the low odds of a future
search.263 The Court also ruled that the plaintiffs had a second ground of standing
in seeking the expungement of data that the government had seized from
plaintiffs’ devices.264 The Court agreed with plaintiffs that this would cure future
harm resulting from past unconstitutional searches of plaintiffs’ devices.265
The memorandum denying the Government’s motion to dismiss analyzed
how the Constitution still protects digital privacy at the border in accordance
with the holding in Riley v. California266 which requires police officers to obtain
a warrant before searching a cell phone under the Fourth Amendment.267 In
reference to digital privacy, the judge stated that “electronic devices implicate
privacy interests in a fundamentally different manner than searches of typical
containers or even searches of a person.”268 The Court also adopted the Riley
approach holding that electronic devices have significant privacy factors
because of the vast amount of information it contains about the owner.269 In the
Alasaad case, one of the most vital privacy interests was the objection by two
plaintiffs, who were Muslim women with religious apprehensions about men
looking at pictures of them without their traditional hijab.270 The Alasaad court
also recognized how manual searches are as intrusive as a forensic search.271 A
“forensic” search is when the officer must use their own digital device to search
the travelers’ device, whereas a “manual” search allows the officer to take
advantage of each travelers’ device and search its contents.272 Additionally, the
Court provided that a manual search renders the same quantity and quality of
information aa a forensic search, and therefore there is no difference in the level
of privacy invasion from these searches.273
In analyzing the government’s interests, the judge again looked to Riley to
clarify that any warrantless search of effects such as electronic devices must be
“tethered” to the government’s interests.274 The government’s interests at the
border in conducting warrantless searches are mainly to prevent the entry of
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harmful items and contraband.275 The question the Court proffers is whether the
warrantless searches of devices advance these interests.276 The judge agreed with
the Plaintiffs that there is a significant contrast between searching for contraband
and searching for evidence of unlawful activity, with the latter having a weaker
tethering.277 The court also ruled that a warrant requirement would not
negatively impact the government’s interests at the border and with the new
technology the process of securing a warrant would be more efficient.278
Specifically, the judge stated that “it is unclear at this juncture the extent to
which a warrant requirement would impede customs officers’ ability to ferret
out such contraband.”279 The Court disagreed with Government’s unsupported
claim that child pornography vindicates the warrantless searches of devices at
the border.280 In accordance with Riley, the Court stated that the Government
must show that the issue they intend to solve with warrantless searches is
“prevalent.”281 Government data has shown that the majority of child
pornography is accessed on the Internet instead of being brought over the
border.282
The Court also stated that the plaintiffs credibly alleged that the lengthy
confiscations of devices without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.283
In the opinion the judge held that seizures must “be reasonable not only at their
inception but also for their duration.”284 The Court looked specifically at the
cases of Mr. Allababidi who had his device confiscated for ten months and Mr.
Wright whose device was confiscated for fifty-six days.285
Although the Court’s opinion was a huge victory for the plaintiffs in the
Alasaad case, the issue remains regarding what level of individualized suspicion
a border agent must have before seizing and searching an electronic device.286
Throughout the case the Government has asserted that the lowest level of
protection, reasonable suspicion is required while the plaintiffs demand the
highest level of protection, which deems a warrant.287 Although this question

United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 532 (1985).
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 259, at 18-19.
277 Id. at 18.
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was not answered by the court the judge advised that a warrant might be the best
choice because with a reasonable suspicion standard there would be “no
practical limit at all.”288
F. Government Shutdown
On January 2, 2019, the Government asked the Alasaad court to freeze
discovery in the case, claiming that its lawyers cannot perform any work due to
the government shutdown that occurred on December 21, 2018.289 The lapse of
funding has prevented the defendants—DHS, CBP and ICE—from gathering the
necessary documents for discovery.290 The shutdown is a result of President
Trump’s demand for $5 billion dollars to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico
border.291 Discovery deadlines were spread throughout the month of January—
the government owed discovery responses by January 8, 2019, both sides
planned to conduct depositions the week of January 14, 2019 and the final
deadline for discovery was set for January 31, 2019.292 The ACLU and EFF have
not responded to any requests for a comment about freezing discovery but
according to court records plaintiffs have taken no position on the motion for a
stay, but instead reserve the right to ask the court to lift it.293
V. RANDOM PROFILING OR DISCRIMINATION?
The CBP has stated that it is their policy not to consider race or ethnicity when
it comes to investigation, screening and law enforcement.294 The DHS has also
issued a policy outlining nondiscriminatory screening and law enforcement
activities.295 The DHS defines “racial profiling” as the “invidious use of race or
ethnicity as a criterion.”296 The DHS also notes that “racial profiling is premised
on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one race or
ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular individual

Id. at 15.
Aaron Leibowitz, Feds Request Pause In Border Search Case Due To Shutdown,
Law360 (Jan. 2, 2019) https://www-law360-com.cualaw.idm.oclc.org/articles/1114694/
feds-request-pause-in-border-search-case-due-to-shutdown.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 CBP Policy on Nondiscrimination in Law Enforcement Activities and all other
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of another race or ethnicity.”297 However, CBP personnel are allowed to use
ethnicity or race whenever a “compelling governmental interest is present and
its use is narrowly tailored to that interest.”298 The CBP further states that
“national security is per se a compelling interest.”299 At a time when the current
administration has campaigned on a nationalist approach and is constantly in
battle with Congress to restrict immigration,300 it is hard to reconcile that race or
ethnicity had nothing to do with the Plaintiffs detainment in the instant case of
Alasaad v. Nielsen.301
The Alasaad family are the key plaintiffs in this case.302 Despite the fact that
Ghassan and Nadia Alasaad are both U.S. citizens, CBP agents humiliated them
without probable cause, nor reasonable suspicion, and without regard that they
were traveling with their sick 11-year old daughter.303 When Nadia objected to
providing the password for her phone because of photos of herself without her
hijab, the CBP officer told the family that if a password was not provided
Nadia’s phone would be confiscated.304 Along with Nadia and Ghassan there are
nine other plaintiffs in the instant case with different occupations and
backgrounds, all of whom have had similar experiences when crossing the
border.305
Suhaib Allababidi is an entrepreneur from Texas who owns a security
installation system with clients in the Federal Government.306 Two phones were
confiscated from him and returned two months later.307 Another plaintiff, Sidd
Bikkannavar, is an engineer from California who works in NASA’s Jet
Propulsion Laboratory.308 Bikkannavar’s work phone was searched with
forensic tools and his private information was analyzed.309 Plaintiff Jeremy
Dupin, who was detained two days in a row while traveling proves that
journalists and filmmakers are not safe either.310 Dupin’s phone was unlocked
forcefully and his sensitive journalism research was inspected.311 CBP even
Id.
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detained professor and artist, Aaron Gach, who was detained until he provided
his phone’s password to agents.312 Another journalist, Isma’il Kushkush from
Virginia was detained three different times and had his phone searched for hours
each time.313 One of the most shocking plaintiffs who was detained by CBP was
Diane Maye, a former Air Force captain and current professor who was
subjected to a two hour search of her laptop and phone.314 Another plaintiff with
impressive credentials, Zainab Merchant, a graduate student at Harvard
University had her laptop and phone searched for two hours as well.315
Unfortunately, CBP has even become physical with plaintiffs such as Akram
Shibly, an independent filmmaker from New York who was detained twice in a
period of days and had his phone searched after agents physically restrained
him.316 The final plaintiff included in the instant case is Matt Wright, an
independent computer programmer from Colorado who had his laptop, smart
phone and camera confiscated for two months.317
The EFF has addressed that several of the Plaintiffs are Muslims and people
of color who have been singled out by CBP agents “newly emboldened by this
administration’s aggressive pursuit of travel and immigration policies targeting
those groups.”318 Plaintiffs argue that the stereotyping of Muslims proves that
CBP and ICE officers do not have reasonable suspicion to search devices but
instead are carrying out searches based on a traveler’s background or religion.
The current political landscape in the United States indicates that there is a racist
and discriminatory view of Muslims by members of the current administration.
For instance, in January 2018, Trump claimed “I’m not a racist. I am the least
racist person you have ever interviewed, that I can tell you,” in response to
comments he was reported to have made, which included a derogatory reference
made regarding African nations.319 Trump even started off his campaign with an
infamous speech and example of harmful stereotyping and generalizing about
Mexicans stating, “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”320 There are numerous well-

312 Matt Cagle & Chris Conley, Why Did the Government Search an Artist’s iPhone at
the Border?, ACLU (May 4, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/privacyborders-and-checkpoints/why-did-government-search-artists-iphone.
313 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 1.
314 Id.
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316 Id.
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318 Hatmaker, supra note 67.
319 Michael D. Shear, ‘I’m Not a Racist,’ Trump Says in Denying Vulgar Comment, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/us/politics/trump-im-not-aracist.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module
=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.
320 Alexander Burns, Choice Words From Donald Trump, Presidential Candidate, N.Y.
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documented incidents of Trump’s racism spanning back in time since his days
as a real estate developer in the 1970’s and 1980’s.321 Although there is a vast
amount of information highlighting Trump’s racist behavior for the purpose of
this comment only statements and conduct towards Muslims will be analyzed
and an argument will be made that his behavior and attitude towards Muslims
has indirectly caused the racial stereotyping and discriminating against Muslim
travelers by CBP and ICE officials.
In December 2015, Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown” of the
entry of Muslims to the United States “until our country’s representatives can
figure out what is going on.”322 Along with this statement released by his
campaign, Trump included poll data that allegedly showed that a large group of
the Muslim population has “great hatred towards Americans.”323 In July 2016,
Trump disparaged the parents of a slain Muslim soldier who had received a gold
star during his service. Trump speculated that only the soldier’s father spoke at
the Democratic National Convention, and not the mother because “maybe she
wasn’t allowed to have anything to say.”324 Trump’s comment that the soldier’s
mother could not speak at the convention because of the obedience expected of
traditional Islamic women, is another classic example of stereotyping
Muslims.325
Lastly, in January 2017, Trump’s racism towards Muslims was embodied
with his creation and execution of what has been referred to as the “Muslim Ban”
or “Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry
into the United States” which are a series of discriminatory executive orders
issued by Trump.326 The first version, which was signed by Trump and enacted
the same day, was immediately blocked by federal courts, which found it to be
unconstitutional, anti-Muslim, and a blatant abuse of the President’s power.327
TIMES (June 16, 2015, 2:01 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/firstdraft/2015/06/16/choice-words-from-donald-trump-presidential-candidate.
321 David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Donald Trump’s Racism: The Definitive
List, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/15/opinion/
leonhardt-trump-racist.html.
322 Jenna Johnson, Trump calls for ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States’, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015, 7:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-ofmuslims-entering-the-united-states/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b6bb461fc276.
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Parents, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2016, at 1.
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Although a majority of the public agree, the U.S. Supreme Court, allowed the
latest version of the ban to go into effect.328 According to Wired Magazine,
“since President Trump’s executive order [Muslim ban] ratcheted up the vetting
of travelers from majority Muslim countries, or even people with Muslimsounding names, passengers have experienced what appears from limited data
to be a ‘spike’ in cases of their devices being seized.”329
A. Unlawful Searches by CBP and ICE of Specific Racial and Religious
Groups Violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution
The 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.330
The Equal Protection Clause in the amendment states that no person can be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process.331 Due process requires
that all legal proceedings will be fair and reasonable.332 The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the federal government through
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.333 The Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the government from discriminating on
the basis of religion, race, religion, and national origin.334 Therefore, border
agents are not allowed to target travelers because they are Muslim in order to
search and seize their electronic devices at the border.335 At one point the
Supreme Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 336 suggested that agents
operating at the Mexican border may look at a traveler’s origin in order to
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establish reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation.337 However in
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 338 a U.S. Circuit Court determined that this
suggestion is not considered anymore due to the changes in demographics and
constitutional law.339 The operation of policies which were enacted under
Trump’s administration unfairly discriminates against Muslims in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.
VI: GETTING PAST CUSTOMS WITH ONE’S DIGITAL PRIVACY
INTACT
Instead of arguing or agreeing with CBP or ICE agents, technological experts
advise travelers to avoid making themselves a victim of arbitrary searches of
devices.340 Wired magazine has provided tips and advice for travelers who want
to keep their digital privacy intact and not be arrested as a result.341 Locking your
device is recommended and travelers can even encrypt their hard drive “with
tools like BitLocker, TrueCrypt, or Apple’s Filevault, and choose a strong
passphrase.”342 Remembering to turn off devices before entering customs is
another solution.343 If you own an iPhone, activating TouchID will require a PIN
rather than one’s fingerprint when the phone is turned on.344 This option resolves
the issue of border agents compelling you to unlock your device with a finger
especially since green card holders must provide fingerprints at every border.345
Keeping passwords a secret from CBP agents is another complex issue.346
Although United States citizens may refuse to provide their passwords, such
citizens risk prolonged detainment and confiscation of their electronic device.347
However, by refusing to reveal the PIN or password to your device, travelers
will likely be able to cross the border with their digital privacy intact.348
Travelers should also be in communication with a lawyer, or someone who can
assist them in contacting legal counsel.349 It is recommended that before entering
337
338
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customs inspection the traveler should contact a third party and then again once
they pass through customs.350 In the event that you are detained or interrogated
at least then there is someone on the outside who can help.351
Denying yourself access is an extreme option which involves bold but easy
steps.352 First, create a “two-factor authentication”353 for private accounts, so
that in order to access them you need a password as well as a code, which has
been sent to your phone in the form of a text message.354 Second, before crossing
the border leave behind the SIM card which will receive the text message
code.355 This method “essentially den[ies] yourself the ability to cooperate with
agents even if you wanted to.”356 Overall, the best advice for travelers who are
at risk of device searches is to pack it in your checked bag or suitcase.357 This
will protect their digital privacy and people always have the option to carry a
designated travel phone with no sensitive data.358
VII. CONCLUSION
In the case of Alasaad v. Nielsen, it is this comment’s opinion that the United
States District Court of Massachusetts should find the Governments’ warrantless
searches of travelers’ electronic devices a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Agents should have probable cause and a warrant to seize and search a traveler’s
device for contraband or evidence of activity in violation of customs and
immigration laws. Currently, agents do not have to show individualized and
particularized suspicion for any specific device which makes their authority
arbitrary and unreasonable. Plaintiffs should be granted declaratory and
injunctive relief against these unlawful searches and seizures. In the near future,
CBP and ICE policies should be further inspected and transformed with digital
privacy being taken into account, as well as devoid of any stereotyping and
discriminatory actions towards Muslim travelers.

350 Cory Doctorow, How to legally cross a US (or other) border without surrendering
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